Data and Code for: Detection of Collusive Networks in Multistage Auctions

Principal Investigator(s):  View help for Principal Investigator(s) Bruno Baranek; Leon Musolff, Business Economics and Public Policy Department, The Wharton School, The University of Pennsylvania; Vitezslav Titl, Utrecht University, School of Economics

Version:  View help for Version V1

Name File Type Size Last Modified
  code 03/06/2026 10:48:AM
  data 03/06/2026 10:48:AM
  dataLocal 03/06/2026 10:47:AM
  output 03/06/2026 10:51:AM
  writing 03/06/2026 10:47:AM
Manifest.toml text/plain 63.7 KB 03/06/2026 05:47:AM
Project.toml text/plain 985 bytes 03/06/2026 05:47:AM
conda_environment.yml text/plain 234 bytes 03/06/2026 05:47:AM
config.do text/plain 301 bytes 03/06/2026 05:47:AM
readMe.md text/x-web-markdown 8.6 KB 03/06/2026 05:47:AM

Project Citation: 

Baranek, Bruno, Musolff, Leon, and Titl, Vitezslav. Data and Code for: Detection of Collusive Networks in Multistage Auctions. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2026. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2026-04-02. https://doi.org/10.3886/E237221V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary We develop a method for detecting cartels in multistage auctions. Our approach allows a firm to be collusive when facing members of its cartel yet competitive when facing others. Intuitively, as initial bids are shaded, close initial bids not only imply similar costs but also provide an incentive to undercut. We detect firm pairs that ignore this incentive when facing each other. Our algorithm predicts Ukraine’s Antimonopoly Committee’s sanctions: firm pairs classified as collusive are 8.98 times more likely (standard error 2.65 times) to be sanctioned. It also uncovers additional collusion: 1,857 collusive firms participate in 15.57% of auctions, increasing costs by 1.95%. Cartels typically comprise just two members, and members often share the same ZIP code.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      D44 Auctions
      H57 National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement


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V1 [2026-04-02]

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