Data and Code for: Optimal Bank Reserve Remuneration and Capital Control Policy

Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) ChunChe Chi, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica; Stephanie Schmitt-Grohe, Columbia University; Martin Uribe, Columbia University

Version: View help for Version V1

Name	File Type	Size	Last Modified
data			02/22/2024 08:36:PM
calibration.m	text/x-matlab	1 KB	11/04/2023 01:33:PM
cea.m	text/x-objcsrc	9.4 KB	11/04/2023 01:33:PM
cea_nobanks.m	text/x-objcsrc	8.1 KB	11/04/2023 01:33:PM
coa.m	text/x-matlab	8 KB	11/04/2023 01:33:PM
coa_nobanks.m	text/x-matlab	8 KB	11/04/2023 01:33:PM
coa_typical_crisis.m	text/x-matlab	1.1 KB	11/04/2023 01:33:PM
compute_corr.m	text/x-matlab	1022 bytes	11/04/2023 01:33:PM
emerging_ld3.xlsx	application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet	54.9 KB	11/04/2023 01:33:PM
emerging_or.xlsx	application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet	67.6 KB	11/04/2023 01:33:PM

Project Citation:

Chi, ChunChe, Schmitt-Grohe, Stephanie, and Uribe, Martin. Data and Code for: Optimal Bank Reserve Remuneration and Capital Control Policy. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2024. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2024-11-22. https://doi.org/10.3886/E194901V1

Project Description

Summary:

This repository contains replication files.

Abstract:

A central prediction of open economy models with a pecuniary externality due to a collateral constraint is that the unregulated economy overborrows relative to what occurs under optimal policy. A maintained assumption in this literature is that households borrow directly from foreign lenders. This paper shows that if foreign lending is intermediated by domestic banks and the government can pay interest on bank reserves and impose capital controls, the unregulated economy underborrows. The optimal bank reserve policy is countercyclical. By increasing bank reserves during contractions, the government acts as a lender of last resort to collateral-constrained households.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
      E58 Central Banks and Their Policies
      F38 International Financial Policy: Financial Transactions Tax; Capital Controls
      F41 Open Economy Macroeconomics

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Published Versions

V1 [2024-11-22]

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