Data and Code for: Patient Versus Provider Incentives in Long-Term Care

Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Martin Hackmann, UCLA; Vincent Pohl, Mathematica Policy Research; Nicolas Ziebarth, Cornell University

Version: View help for Version V1

Name	File Type	Size	Last Modified
Replication			01/10/2024 09:48:AM

Project Citation:

Hackmann, Martin, Pohl, Vincent, and Ziebarth, Nicolas . Data and Code for: Patient Versus Provider Incentives in Long-Term Care. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2024. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2024-06-05. https://doi.org/10.3886/E193732V1

Project Description

Summary: How do patient and provider incentives affect the provision of long-term care? Our analysis of 551 thousand nursing home stays yields three main insights. First, Medicaid-covered residents prolong their stays instead of transitioning to community-based care due to limited cost-sharing. Second, when facility capacity binds, nursing homes shorten Medicaid stays to admit more profitable out-of-pocket private payers. Third, providers react more elastically to financial incentives than patients. Thus, targeting provider incentives through alternative payment models, such as episode-based reimbursement, is more effective than increasing patient cost-sharing in facilitating transitions to community-based care and generating long-term care savings.

Funding Sources: United States Department of Health and Human Services. National Institutes of Health. National Institute on Aging (P01 AG005842-29)

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
      H51 National Government Expenditures and Health
      H75 State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions
      I11 Analysis of Health Care Markets
      I18 Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
      J14 Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped; Non-labor Market Discrimination

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Published Versions

V1 [2024-06-05]

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