Data and Code for: A Road to Efficiency through Communication and Commitment
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Ala Avoyan, Indiana University; Joao Ramos, University of Southern California
Version: View help for Version V1
| Name | File Type | Size | Last Modified |
|---|---|---|---|
| code | 03/01/2023 06:08:PM | ||
| data | 07/21/2023 08:39:PM | ||
| experimental-code | 03/01/2023 06:28:PM | ||
| experimental-instructions | 03/01/2023 06:31:PM | ||
| results | 03/01/2023 06:12:PM | ||
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application/pdf | 64.1 KB | 07/22/2023 08:45:AM |
Project Citation:
Avoyan, Ala, and Ramos, Joao. Data and Code for: A Road to Efficiency through Communication and Commitment. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2023. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2023-08-16. https://doi.org/10.3886/E185662V1
Project Description
Summary:
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The data and code used for paper: "A Road to Efficiency through Communication and Commitment"
In the paper, we experimentally examine the efficacy of a novel pre-play institution in a well-known coordination game-the minimum-effort game-in which coordination failures are robust and persistent phenomena. This new institution allows agents to communicate while incrementally committing to their words, leading to a distinct theoretical prediction: the efficient outcome is uniquely selected in the extended coordination game. We find that commitment-enhanced communication significantly increases subjects' payoffs and achieves higher efficiency levels than various non-binding forms of communication. We further identify the key ingredients of the institution that are central to achieving such gains.
In the paper, we experimentally examine the efficacy of a novel pre-play institution in a well-known coordination game-the minimum-effort game-in which coordination failures are robust and persistent phenomena. This new institution allows agents to communicate while incrementally committing to their words, leading to a distinct theoretical prediction: the efficient outcome is uniquely selected in the extended coordination game. We find that commitment-enhanced communication significantly increases subjects' payoffs and achieves higher efficiency levels than various non-binding forms of communication. We further identify the key ingredients of the institution that are central to achieving such gains.
Funding Sources:
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New York University;
University of Southern California;
Indiana University
Scope of Project
Subject Terms:
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Lab Experiment
JEL Classification:
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C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
C92 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
P41 Other Economic Systems: Planning, Coordination, and Reform
C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
C92 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
P41 Other Economic Systems: Planning, Coordination, and Reform
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