Mid-judging merit: The effects of adjudication errors in contests

Principal Investigator(s):  View help for Principal Investigator(s) Astrid Gamba, University of Insubria

Version:  View help for Version V3

Name File Type Size Last Modified
EXPERIMENT_04_06_2015_LOSS.ztt application/octet-stream 173.2 KB 11/10/2022 09:35:PM
EXPERIMENT_06_11_2015_GAIN.ztt application/octet-stream 156.5 KB 06/04/2015 06:46:AM
Instructions_penalty_ENG.pdf application/pdf 439 KB 07/11/2016 09:01:AM
Instructions_penalty_ITA.pdf application/pdf 442.2 KB 11/14/2022 12:00:PM
Instructions_prize_ENG.pdf application/pdf 440.9 KB 11/14/2022 11:59:AM
Instructions_prize_ITA.pdf application/pdf 450.5 KB 07/11/2016 08:57:AM
Post-experimental questionnaire-ENG.pdf application/pdf 109.1 KB 07/11/2016 07:55:AM
README.pdf application/pdf 152.9 KB 05/21/2015 02:36:PM
data_Mis-judgingMerit_GambaStanca.dta application/x-stata-dta 3.4 MB 11/09/2022 11:01:PM
do_Mis-judgingMerit_GambaStanca.do text/plain 22.8 KB 11/13/2022 03:44:AM

Project Citation: 

Gamba, Astrid. Mid-judging merit: The effects of adjudication errors in contests. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2022-11-14. https://doi.org/10.3886/E182901V3

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary 
Within contests, adjudication errors imply at the same time the exclusion of a meritorious candidate and the inclusion of a non-meritorious one. We study theoretically how adjudication errors affect bids in all-pay auctions, by disentangling the respective effects of exclusion and inclusion errors, and showing how they interact with the framing of incentives (prize or penalty) under different assumptions on preferences. We test our theoretical predictions with an experiment where we manipulate the presence of exclusion errors, inclusion errors, and the framing of incentives. The experimental evidence indicates that errors of either exclusion or inclusion significantly decrease bids in all-pay auctions relative to a setting without errors, interacting negatively, with no significant difference in the size of their effects. Bid levels are significantly higher in a penalty framing relative to a prize framing, both in the absence of errors and in the presence of adjudication errors.
Funding Sources:  View help for Funding Sources Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance

Scope of Project

Subject Terms:  View help for Subject Terms adjudication errors; contests; experiment
Collection Date(s):  View help for Collection Date(s) 5/22/2015 – 11/25/2015
Data Type(s):  View help for Data Type(s) experimental data

Methodology

Sampling:  View help for Sampling Experimental subjects are undergraduate students from various disciplines at University of Milan-Bicocca, recruited through ORSEE.
Collection Mode(s):  View help for Collection Mode(s) other
Unit(s) of Observation:  View help for Unit(s) of Observation Individuals, contributions

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Published Versions

V3 [2022-11-14]

V2 [2022-11-13]

V1 [2022-11-10]

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