Data and Code for: Adverse Selection in Low-Income Health Insurance Markets: Evidence from an RCT in Pakistan
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Torben Fischer, IDinsight; Markus Frölich, University of Mannheim (Germany); Andreas Landmann, Friedrich-Alexander University (FAU) Erlangen-Nürnberg
Version: View help for Version V1
| Name | File Type | Size | Last Modified |
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| Analysis | 08/23/2022 03:14:AM | ||
| Cleaning-Code | 08/23/2022 03:11:AM | ||
| QGIS-Files | 08/23/2022 03:09:AM | ||
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application/pdf | 288.1 KB | 08/22/2022 11:07:PM |
Project Citation:
Fischer, Torben, Frölich, Markus, and Landmann, Andreas . Data and Code for: Adverse Selection in Low-Income Health Insurance Markets: Evidence from an RCT in Pakistan. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2023. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2023-06-20. https://doi.org/10.3886/E178421V1
Project Description
Summary:
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We present robust evidence on adverse selection in
hospitalization insurance for low-income individuals that received first time
access to insurance. A large randomized control trial from Pakistan allows us
to separate adverse selection from moral hazard, to estimate how selection
changes at different points of the demand curve and to test simple measures
against adverse selection. The results reveal substantial selection in
individual policies, leading to welfare losses and the threat of a market
breakdown. Bundling insurance policies at the household or higher levels almost
eliminates adverse selection, thus mitigating its welfare consequences and facilitating
sustainable insurance supply.
Scope of Project
Subject Terms:
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Adverse Selection;
Health Insurance;
Pakistan
JEL Classification:
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D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
I13 Health Insurance, Public and Private
O12 Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
I13 Health Insurance, Public and Private
O12 Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
Geographic Coverage:
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Pakistan
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