Replication materials for: On the Effectiveness of Elected Male and Female Leaders and Team Coordination
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Ernesto Reuben; Krisztina Timko
Version: View help for Version V1
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application/pdf | 880.1 KB | 07/25/2022 05:08:AM |
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application/pdf | 192.9 KB | 07/25/2022 06:11:AM |
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text/plain | 23.7 KB | 04/26/2015 03:29:PM |
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text/plain | 8.5 KB | 07/25/2022 05:12:AM |
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application/x-stata-dta | 672.7 KB | 07/25/2022 05:05:AM |
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application/octet-stream | 212.5 KB | 07/25/2022 06:10:AM |
Project Citation:
Reuben, Ernesto, and Timko, Krisztina. Replication materials for: On the Effectiveness of Elected Male and Female Leaders and Team Coordination. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2022-07-25. https://doi.org/10.3886/E176101V1
Project Description
Summary:
View help for Summary
We study the effect on coordination in a minimum-effort game of a leader's gender depending on whether the leader is democratically elected or is randomly-selected. Leaders use non-binding messages to try to convince followers to coordinate on the Pareto-efficient equilibrium. We find that teams with elected leaders coordinate on higher effort levels. Initially, the benefits of being elected are captured solely by male leaders. However, this gender difference disappears with repeated interaction because unsuccessful male leaders are reelected more often than unsuccessful female leaders.
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