Data and Code for: Fake News, Voter Overconfidence, and the Quality of Democratic Choice
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Melis Kartal, Vienna University of Economics and Business; Jean-Robert Tyran, University of Vienna
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Citation:
Kartal, Melis, and Tyran, Jean-Robert. Data and Code for: Fake News, Voter Overconfidence, and the Quality of Democratic Choice. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2022. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2022-09-23. https://doi.org/10.3886/E171882V1
Project Description
Summary:
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This deposit contains the data and code for the analyses reported in "Fake News, Voter Overconfidence, and the Quality of Democratic Choice."
Abstract: This paper studies, theoretically and experimentally, the effects of overconfidence and fake news on information aggregation and the quality of democratic choice in a common-interest setting. We theoretically show that overconfidence exacerbates the adverse effects of widespread misinformation (i.e., fake news). We then analyze richer models that allow for partisanship, targeted misinformation intended to sway public opinion, and news signals correlated across voters (due to media ownership concentration or censorship). In our experiment, overconfidence severely undermines information aggregation, suggesting that the effect of overconfidence can be much more pronounced at the collective than at the individual level.
Funding Sources:
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University of Vienna
Scope of Project
Subject Terms:
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[behavioral political economy;
misinformation;
, voting ;
Dunning-Kruger effect;
laboratory experiment;
]
JEL Classification:
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D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
D91 Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
D91 Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
Geographic Coverage:
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Austria
Time Period(s):
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12/6/2017 – 11/18/2021
Collection Date(s):
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12/6/2017 – 11/18/2021
Universe:
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Students
Students
Data Type(s):
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experimental data
Methodology
Response Rate:
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We conducted 38
in-person sessions at the Vienna Center for Experimental Economics (VCEE)
laboratory at the University of Vienna between December 2017 and November 2021
with a total of 684 subjects. All subjects who were registered finished the experiment.
Sampling:
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There are several thousands of subjects registered for experiments at VCEE each year. We randomly invited individuals from this sample.
Data Source:
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Laboratory experiments conducted at VCEE at the University of Vienna.
Unit(s) of Observation:
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Individuals
Related Publications
Published Versions
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