Data and code for: "Recruitment, effort, and retention effects of performance contracts for civil servants: Experimental evidence from Rwandan primary schools." by Clare Leaver, Owen Ozier, Pieter Serneels, and Andrew Zeitlin.

Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Clare Leaver, Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford; Owen Ozier, Williams College; Pieter Serneels, School of International Development, University of East Anglia; Andrew Zeitlin, McCourt School of Public Policy, Georgetown University

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0_scripts			06/21/2021 07:41:AM
1_data			01/14/2021 06:17:AM
2_tex			01/17/2021 10:31:AM
README.md	text/x-web-markdown	19.9 KB	01/17/2021 05:20:AM
README.pdf	application/pdf	365.7 KB	01/17/2021 05:18:AM

Project Citation:

Leaver, Clare, Ozier, Owen, Serneels, Pieter, and Zeitlin, Andrew. Data and code for: “Recruitment, effort, and retention effects of performance contracts for civil servants: Experimental evidence from Rwandan primary schools.” by Clare Leaver, Owen Ozier, Pieter Serneels, and Andrew Zeitlin. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2021. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2021-06-23. https://doi.org/10.3886/E121941V1

Project Description

Summary: This paper reports on a two-tiered experiment designed to separately identify the selection and effort margins of pay-for-performance (P4P). At the recruitment stage, teacher labor markets were randomly assigned to a ‘pay-for-percentile’ or fixed-wage contract. Once recruits were placed, an unexpected, incentive-compatible, school-level re-randomization was performed, so that some teachers who applied for a fixed-wage contract ended up being paid by P4P, and vice versa. By the second year of the study, the within-year effort effect of P4P was 0.16 standard deviations of pupil learning, with the total effect rising to 0.20 standard deviations after allowing for selection.

Funding Sources: UK DfID via IGC and EDI; Oxford University John Fell Fund; World Bank SIEF and REACH trust funds

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
      C93 Field Experiments
      I21 Analysis of Education
      J45 Public Sector Labor Markets
      M52 Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
      O15 Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration

Geographic Coverage: Rwanda

Time Period(s): 2015 – 2018

Collection Date(s): 2015 – 2018

Universe: Pupils, Teacher, and Applicants to be teachers in Rwanda. Relevant grades are P4, P5, and P6.

Data Type(s): experimental data; survey data

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Published Versions

V1 [2021-06-23]

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DDI 2.5

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