Name File Type Size Last Modified
Complete data text/x-stata-syntax 35.1 KB 05/10/2020 11:02:AM
Debriefing.ztq application/octet-stream 996 bytes 05/10/2020 11:08:AM
PG_CompVote.ztt application/octet-stream 71.6 KB 12/27/2002 05:44:AM
PGvotecompete.dta application/x-stata 259 KB 11/11/2012 12:00:AM
Readme.txt text/plain 925 bytes 08/19/2013 01:03:AM application/zip 182.4 KB 08/20/2013 12:00:PM

Project Citation: 

Markussen, Thomas, Reuben, Ernesto, and Tyran, Jean-Robert. Replication data for: Competition, Cooperation and Collective Choice. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2020-05-10.

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary The ability of groups to implement efficiency‐enhancing institutions is emerging as a central theme of research in economics. This study explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition, which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma situation. Experimental results show that the competitive scheme fosters cooperation. Competition is popular but the electoral outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decide, competition is almost always adopted. If likely losers from competition have veto power, it is often not, and substantial gains in efficiency are foregone.

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