Replication data for: Competition, Cooperation and Collective Choice
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Thomas Markussen; Ernesto Reuben; Jean‐Robert Tyran
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Citation:
Markussen, Thomas, Reuben, Ernesto, and Tyran, Jean-Robert. Replication data for: Competition, Cooperation and Collective Choice. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2020-05-10. https://doi.org/10.3886/E119370V1
Project Description
Summary:
View help for Summary
The ability of groups to implement efficiency‐enhancing institutions is emerging as a central theme of research in economics. This study explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition, which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma situation. Experimental results show that the competitive scheme fosters cooperation. Competition is popular but the electoral outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decide, competition is almost always adopted. If likely losers from competition have veto power, it is often not, and substantial gains in efficiency are foregone.
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