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  New-sessions 05/10/2020 08:03:AM
  Old-sessions 05/10/2020 08:02:AM
  Survey 05/10/2020 08:03:AM
create experimental text/x-stata-syntax 3.8 KB 05/10/2020 02:42:AM
create survey text/x-stata-syntax 8 KB 05/10/2020 04:00:AM
hetpgdata.dta application/x-stata 117.4 KB 05/10/2020 01:03:AM
surveyfinal.dta application/x-stata 93.9 KB 05/10/2020 03:58:AM

Project Citation: 

Reuben, Ernesto, and Riedl, Arno. Replication data for: Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2020-05-10.

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary We investigate the emergence and enforcement of contribution norms to public goods in homogeneous and heterogeneous groups. With survey data we demonstrate that uninvolved individuals hold well defined yet conflicting normative views of fair contribution rules related to efficiency, equality, and equity. In the experiment, in the absence of punishment no positive contribution norm is observed and all groups converge towards free-riding. With punishment, strong and stable differences in contributions emerge across group types and individuals in different roles. In some cases these differences result from the emergence of an efficiency norm where all fully contribute. In the cases where full efficiency is not attained, these differences result from the enforcement of different relative contribution norms. Hence, our experimental data show that, even in heterogeneous groups, individuals can overcome the collective action problem inherent in public good games by agreeing on and enforcing a contribution norm.

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