Cell Phone Access and Election Fraud: Evidence from a Spatial Regression Discontinuity Design in Afghanistan
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Robert Gonzalez, University of South Carolina
Version: View help for Version V1
Name | File Type | Size | Last Modified |
---|---|---|---|
Replication | 05/12/2020 08:52:PM |
Project Citation:
Gonzalez, Robert. Cell Phone Access and Election Fraud: Evidence from a Spatial Regression Discontinuity Design in Afghanistan. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2021. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2021-03-16. https://doi.org/10.3886/E118467V1
Project Description
Summary:
View help for Summary
This paper examines the impact of cell phone access on election fraud in the context of the 2009 Afghan presidential election. I combine cell phone coverage maps with unique data on the location of polling centers to accurately pinpoint which centers were exposed to coverage during the election. Results from a spatial regression discontinuity design along the two-dimensional coverage boundary provide considerable evidence that access to cell phones deters corrupt behavior. Polling centers just inside coverage areas report a drop in the share of fraudulent votes of about 4 percentage points while the likelihood of a fraudulent station goes down by about 8 percentage points. Analyses of the effect of coverage on citizen participation in election monitoring, election-related insurgent violence, and the tribal composition of villages suggest that the observed declines in fraud are likely attributed to cell phone access strengthening social monitoring capacity. From a policy perspective, these results illustrate how a widespread technology, namely cell phones, can exert a positive externality on institutional development via corruption deterrence.
Scope of Project
Subject Terms:
View help for Subject Terms
election fraud;
spatial regression discontinuity;
cell phone
JEL Classification:
View help for JEL Classification
D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D73 Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
P16 Capitalist Systems: Political Economy
P35 Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions: Public Economics
P37 Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies: Legal Institutions; Illegal Behavior
D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D73 Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
P16 Capitalist Systems: Political Economy
P35 Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions: Public Economics
P37 Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies: Legal Institutions; Illegal Behavior
Geographic Coverage:
View help for Geographic Coverage
Afghanistan
Time Period(s):
View help for Time Period(s)
2009 – 2009
Data Type(s):
View help for Data Type(s)
administrative records data;
geographic information system (GIS) data;
survey data
Methodology
Unit(s) of Observation:
View help for Unit(s) of Observation
polling centers,
villages
Geographic Unit:
View help for Geographic Unit
Afghanistan
Related Publications
Published Versions
Report a Problem
Found a serious problem with the data, such as disclosure risk or copyrighted content? Let us know.
This material is distributed exactly as it arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the investigator(s) if further information is desired.