Data and Code for: "Competition and Price Transparency in the Market for Lemons: Experimental Evidence"

Principal Investigator(s):  View help for Principal Investigator(s) Olivier Bochet, NYU Abu Dhabi; Simon Siegenthaler, University of Texas at Dallas

Version:  View help for Version V1

Name File Type Size Last Modified
CompetitionAndPriceTransparency-Data.dta application/x-stata 21.4 MB 12/16/2019 12:45:PM
CompetitionAndPriceTransparency-DataAnalysis.do text/x-stata-syntax 14 KB 02/13/2020 09:21:AM
CompetitionAndPriceTransparency-DataBargaining.xlsx application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet 4.4 MB 12/16/2019 12:18:PM
CompetitionAndPriceTransparency-DataRiskTask.xlsx application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet 27.4 KB 12/16/2019 11:22:AM
PredictionsTable3and6.nb text/plain 60.7 KB 04/30/2020 06:36:AM
README.txt text/plain 578 bytes 04/24/2020 05:17:AM

Project Citation: 

Bochet, Olivier, and Siegenthaler, Simon. Data and Code for: “Competition and Price Transparency in the Market for Lemons: Experimental Evidence.” Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2021. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2021-04-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E116771V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary
In markets with asymmetric information, where equilibria are often inefficient, bargaining can help promote welfare. We design an experiment to examine the impact of competition and price transparency in such settings. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, we find that competition promotes efficiency if bargainers cannot observe each other’s price offers. Contrary to the predictions, however, the efficiency-enhancing effect of competition persists even when offers are observable. We explore different behavioral explanations for the absence of a detrimental effect of price transparency. Remarkably, implementing the strategy method improves subjects’ conditional reasoning, delivering the predicted loss in efficiency when offers are observable.

Scope of Project

Subject Terms:  View help for Subject Terms Bargaining; Adverse Selection; Price Transparency; Strategic Complexity
JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      C70 Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
      C92 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
      D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Geographic Coverage:  View help for Geographic Coverage Switzerland and Spain
Universe:  View help for Universe University students in Switzerland and Spain.
Data Type(s):  View help for Data Type(s) experimental data

Methodology

Response Rate:  View help for Response Rate 100%, lab study.
Sampling:  View help for Sampling Online recruiting platform ORSEE.
Collection Mode(s):  View help for Collection Mode(s) other
Unit(s) of Observation:  View help for Unit(s) of Observation Individuals

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Published Versions

V1 [2021-04-12]

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