Replication data for: Can Electronic Procurement Improve Infrastructure Provision? Evidence from Public Works in India and Indonesia
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Sean Lewis-Faupel; Yusuf Neggers; Benjamin A. Olken; Rohini Pande
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Citation:
Lewis-Faupel, Sean, Neggers, Yusuf, Olken, Benjamin A., and Pande, Rohini. Replication data for: Can Electronic Procurement Improve Infrastructure Provision? Evidence from Public Works in India and Indonesia. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2016. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-13. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114617V1
Project Description
Summary:
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This paper examines whether electronic procurement (e-procurement), which increases access to information and reduces personal interactions with potentially corrupt officials, improves procurement outcomes. We develop unique datasets from India and Indonesia and use variation in adoption of e-procurement within both countries. We find no evidence of reduced prices but do find that e-procurement leads to quality improvements. In India, where we observe quality directly, e-procurement improves road quality, and in Indonesia, e-procurement reduces delays. Regions with e-procurement are more likely to have winners come from outside the region. On net, the results suggest that e-procurement facilitates entry from higher quality contractors.
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H54 National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Infrastructures; Other Public Investment and Capital Stock
H57 National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement
L12 Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
O22 Project Analysis
R42 Transportation Economics: Government and Private Investment Analysis; Road Maintenance, Transportation Planning
D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H54 National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Infrastructures; Other Public Investment and Capital Stock
H57 National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement
L12 Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
O22 Project Analysis
R42 Transportation Economics: Government and Private Investment Analysis; Road Maintenance, Transportation Planning
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