Replication data for: Dynamic Noisy Signaling

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MIC2016-0336_data			10/12/2019 11:05:PM
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Project Citation:

Heinsalu, Sander. Replication data for: Dynamic Noisy Signaling. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2018. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114363V1

Project Description

Summary: This article studies costly signaling. The signaling effort is chosen in multiple periods and observed with noise. The signaler benefits from the belief of the market, not directly from the effort or the signal. Optimal signaling behavior in time-varying environments trades off effort-smoothing and influencing belief exactly when it yields a return. If the return to signaling first increases over time and then decreases, then the optimal effort rises slowly, reaches its maximum before the return does, and declines quickly. Advertising data displays this pattern.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
      C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
      D12 Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
      D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
      D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
      M31 Marketing
      M37 Advertising

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Published Versions

V1 [2019-10-12]

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DDI 2.5

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