Name File Type Size Last Modified
  replication 10/12/2019 06:56:AM
LICENSE.txt text/plain 14.6 KB 10/12/2019 02:57:AM

Project Citation: 

Bursztyn, Leonardo, Fujiwara, Thomas, and Pallais, Amanda. Replication data for: “Acting Wife”: Marriage Market Incentives and Labor Market Investments. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2017. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113174V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary Do single women avoid career-enhancing actions because these actions signal undesirable traits, like ambition, to the marriage market? While married and unmarried female MBA students perform similarly when their performance is unobserved by classmates (on exams and problem sets), unmarried women have lower participation grades. In a field experiment, single female students reported lower desired salaries and willingness to travel and work long hours on a real-stakes placement questionnaire when they expected their classmates to see their preferences. Other groups' responses were unaffected by peer observability. A second experiment indicates the effects are driven by observability by single male peers.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      C93 Field Experiments
      D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
      J12 Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure; Domestic Abuse
      J16 Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
      J31 Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials


Related Publications

Published Versions

Export Metadata

Report a Problem

Found a serious problem with the data, such as disclosure risk or copyrighted content? Let us know.

This material is distributed exactly as it arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the investigator(s) if further information is desired.