Replication data for: Monitoring Corruptible Politicians

Name: Replication data for: Monitoring Corruptible Politicians
Published: 2016-08-01
License: This work is licensed under an Other license created by the data depositor. Please refer to the LICENSE file, which should be located alongside the project data and documentation.
Keywords: observational data

Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Gustavo J. Bobonis; Luis R. Cámara Fuertes; Rainer Schwabe

Version: View help for Version V1

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Project Citation:

Bobonis, Gustavo J., Cámara Fuertes, Luis R., and Schwabe, Rainer. Replication data for: Monitoring Corruptible Politicians. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2016. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112932V1

Project Description

Summary: Does monitoring corrupt activities induce a sustained reduction in corruption? Using longitudinal data on audits of municipal governments in Puerto Rico, we show corruption is considerably lower in municipalities with timely audits—before elections. However, these municipalities do not exhibit decreased levels of corruption in subsequent audits, even while mayors in these benefit from higher reelection rates. Our results suggest that audits enable voters to select responsive but corruptible politicians to office. Audit programs must disseminate results when they are most relevant for voters—shortly before an election—and ensure that these programs are sustained, long-term commitments.

Scope of Project

Subject Terms: observational data

JEL Classification:
      D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
      H83 Public Administration; Public Sector Accounting and Audits
      K42 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
      O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

Geographic Coverage: Puerto Rico (USA)

Time Period(s): 1/1987 – 12/2005

Universe: Municipal governments audited by Office of Comptroller of Puerto Rico during period 1987-2005

Data Type(s): administrative records data; census/enumeration data; observational data

Methodology

Unit(s) of Observation: municipality and audit period,

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Published Versions

V1 [2019-10-12]

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DDI 2.5

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