Replication data for: Selection on Moral Hazard in Health Insurance
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Liran Einav; Amy Finkelstein; Stephen P. Ryan; Paul Schrimpf; Mark R. Cullen
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Citation:
Einav, Liran, Finkelstein, Amy, Ryan, Stephen P., Schrimpf, Paul, and Cullen, Mark R. Replication data for: Selection on Moral Hazard in Health Insurance. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2013. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-11. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112587V1
Project Description
Summary:
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We use employee-level panel data from a single firm to explore the
possibility that individuals may select insurance coverage in part
based on their anticipated behavioral ("moral hazard") response
to insurance, a phenomenon we label "selection on moral hazard."
Using a model of plan choice and medical utilization, we present
evidence of heterogenous moral hazard as well as selection on it,
and explore some of its implications. For example, we show that,
at least in our context, abstracting from selection on moral hazard
could lead to overestimates of the spending reduction associated
with introducing a high-deductible health insurance option. (JEL
D82, G22, I13, J32)
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
G22 Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
I13 Health Insurance, Public and Private
J32 Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions
D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
G22 Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
I13 Health Insurance, Public and Private
J32 Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions
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