Replication package for: The Perils of High-Powered Incentives: Evidence from Colombia's False Positives

Principal Investigator(s):  View help for Principal Investigator(s) Daron Acemoglu, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics; Leopoldo Fergusson, Universidad de los Andes, Department of Economics; James Robinson, University of Chicago, Harris School of Public Policy; Dario Romero, Columbia University, Department of Economics; Juan F. Vargas, Universidad del Rosario, Department of Economics

Version:  View help for Version V1

Name File Type Size Last Modified
  Data 08/22/2019 10:21:PM
  Programs 10/17/2019 11:27:AM
  Tables 08/22/2019 10:23:PM
readme.pdf application/pdf 126.9 KB 10/17/2019 07:36:AM

Project Citation: 

Acemoglu, Daron, Fergusson, Leopoldo, Robinson, James, Romero, Dario, and Vargas, Juan F. Replication package for: The Perils of High-Powered Incentives: Evidence from Colombia’s False Positives. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2020. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2020-07-23. https://doi.org/10.3886/E111542V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary
We investigate the use of high-powered incentives for Colombian army members, and show that it produced several perverse side effects. Innocent civilians were killed and misrepresented as guerillas (a phenomenon known in Colombia as ‘false positives’). There were significantly more false positives during the period of high- powered incentives in municipalities with weaker judicial institutions and where a higher share of brigades were commanded by colonels (who have stronger career concerns than generals). In municipalities with a higher share of colonels, the high-powered incentives period also coincided with a worsening of local judicial institutions and no discernible improvement in overall security.

Scope of Project

Subject Terms:  View help for Subject Terms HIgh-powered inventives; Military; Conflict
JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      D02 Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
      D73 Bureaucracy • Administrative Processes in Public Organizations • Corruption
      D74 Conflict • Conflict Resolution • Alliances • Revolutions
      D82 Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
      K42 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
      K42
Geographic Coverage:  View help for Geographic Coverage Colombia
Time Period(s):  View help for Time Period(s) 2000 – 2010
Universe:  View help for Universe Panel of Colombian Municipalities
Data Type(s):  View help for Data Type(s) geographic information system (GIS) data; observational data

Methodology

Data Source:  View help for Data Source
CINEP’s Data Bank on Human Rights and Politi- cal Violence.
CERAC-Universidad del Rosario with information from CINEP.
Inspector General of Colombia
Colombian Army Web- page 
Municipal Panel, CEDE, Universidad de los Andes 
Colombian Statistical Agency (DANE)
Colombian National Planning Department (DNP) 
Colombian Institute for Higher Education (ICFES) 
Unit(s) of Observation:  View help for Unit(s) of Observation Municipalities yearly

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V1 [2020-07-23]

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