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Project Citation: 

Kessler, Judd B., Low, Corinne, and Sullivan, Colin D. Replication data for: Incentivized Resume Rating: Eliciting Employer Preferences without Deception. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2019. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2025-05-30. https://doi.org/10.3886/E231422V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary We introduce a new experimental paradigm to evaluate employer preferences, called incentivized resume rating (IRR). Employers evaluate resumes they know to be hypothetical in order to be matched with real job seekers, preserving incentives while avoiding the deception necessary in audit studies. We deploy IRR with employers recruiting college seniors from a prestigious school, randomizing human capital characteristics and demographics of hypothetical candidates. We measure both employer preferences for candidates and employer beliefs about the likelihood that candidates will accept job offers, avoiding a typical confound in audit studies. We discuss the costs, benefits, and future applications of this new methodology.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
      I26 Returns to Education
      J23 Labor Demand
      J24 Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
      M51 Personnel Economics: Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions


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