The Political Economy of Commodity Cartel Formation: The Case of Coffee, 1930-1940
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Marcelo Bucheli, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Version: View help for Version V1
| Name | File Type | Size | Last Modified |
|---|---|---|---|
|
|
application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document | 82.3 KB | 04/30/2025 03:19:PM |
Project Citation:
Bucheli, Marcelo. The Political Economy of Commodity Cartel Formation: The Case of Coffee, 1930-1940. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2025-04-30. https://doi.org/10.3886/E228262V1
Project Description
Summary:
View help for Summary
We inquire how a commodity cartel is created by studying the negotiations between Colombia and Brazil to stabilize the international coffee market in the 1930s. We show how differences between actors involved in the industry within the negotiating countries in terms of land ownership and type of coffee produced prevented early cartelization agreements. Cartelization was only achieved when four factors converged: financial and infrastructural capability to store excess production, in-depth knowledge of the industry by the negotiating parties, full government support, and presence of a third-party enforcer. We combine an innovative game theoretic approach with previously unexplored archival sources.
Scope of Project
Geographic Coverage:
View help for Geographic Coverage
Colombia,
Brazil
Time Period(s):
View help for Time Period(s)
1930 – 1940
Related Publications
Published Versions
Report a Problem
Found a serious problem with the data, such as disclosure risk or copyrighted content? Let us know.
This material is distributed exactly as it arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the investigator(s) if further information is desired.