Data and Code for: Regional Dissent: Do Local Economic Conditions Influence FOMC Votes?
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Anton Bobrov, University of Michigan; Rupal Kamdar, Indiana University, Bloomington; Mauricio Ulate, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
Version: View help for Version V1
Name | File Type | Size | Last Modified |
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Code | 12/18/2024 02:05:PM | ||
Data | 11/04/2024 02:40:AM | ||
Figures | 12/18/2024 02:06:PM | ||
Output | 12/18/2024 02:08:PM | ||
Tables | 12/18/2024 02:10:PM | ||
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application/pdf | 248.3 KB | 12/19/2024 09:55:PM |
Project Citation:
Bobrov, Anton, Kamdar, Rupal, and Ulate, Mauricio. Data and Code for: Regional Dissent: Do Local Economic Conditions Influence FOMC Votes? Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2025. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2025-05-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E210141V1
Project Description
Summary:
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U.S. monetary-policy decisions are made by the 12 voting members of the FOMC. Seven of these members inherently represent national-level interests. The remaining members, a rotating group of presidents from the 12 Federal Reserve districts, come instead from sub-national jurisdictions. Does this structure have implications for the monetary policy-making process? We provide novel evidence that regional economic conditions influence the voting behavior of district presidents. Specifically, a regional unemployment rate that is one-percentage-point higher than the national level is associated with an approximately nine-percentage-points higher probability of dissenting in favor of looser policy at the FOMC.
Scope of Project
Subject Terms:
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Monetary Policy;
FOMC;
Regional Economic Conditions;
Taylor Rule
JEL Classification:
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E32 Business Fluctuations; Cycles
E52 Monetary Policy
E58 Central Banks and Their Policies
E61 Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
E32 Business Fluctuations; Cycles
E52 Monetary Policy
E58 Central Banks and Their Policies
E61 Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
Geographic Coverage:
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United States of America
Time Period(s):
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1/1/1990 – 12/31/2017
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