Data and Code for: The Good Wife? Reputation Dynamics and Financial Decision-Making Inside the Household
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Nina Buchmann, Yale University; Pascaline Dupas, Princeton University; Roberta Ziparo, Aix-Marseille School of Economics
Version: View help for Version V1
| Name | File Type | Size | Last Modified |
|---|---|---|---|
| Replication_package | 10/31/2024 04:43:PM |
Project Citation:
Buchmann, Nina, Dupas, Pascaline, and Ziparo, Roberta. Data and Code for: The Good Wife? Reputation Dynamics and Financial Decision-Making Inside the Household. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2025. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2025-01-07. https://doi.org/10.3886/E209322V1
Project Description
Summary:
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This package contains the replication package for “The Good Wife? Reputation Dynamics and Financial Decision-Making Inside the Household” by Nina Buchmann, Pascaline Dupas, and Roberta Ziparo. It contains all data and code necessary for replicating the tables and figures in the paper. The data files are in Stata (.dta), and the replication code was written in Stata. Replication of the tables and figures will take approximately 10 minutes.
The abstract of the associated paper is as follows:
We study reputation dynamics within the household in a setting where women regularly receive transfers from their husbands for household purchases. We propose a signaling model in which wives try to maintain a good reputation in the eyes of their husband to receive high transfers. This leads them to (a) avoid risky purchases (goods with unknown returns); and (b) knowingly over-use low-return goods to hide bad purchase decisions—we call this the intra-household sunk cost effect. We present supportive evidence for the model from a series of experiments with married couples in rural Malawi
The abstract of the associated paper is as follows:
We study reputation dynamics within the household in a setting where women regularly receive transfers from their husbands for household purchases. We propose a signaling model in which wives try to maintain a good reputation in the eyes of their husband to receive high transfers. This leads them to (a) avoid risky purchases (goods with unknown returns); and (b) knowingly over-use low-return goods to hide bad purchase decisions—we call this the intra-household sunk cost effect. We present supportive evidence for the model from a series of experiments with married couples in rural Malawi
Funding Sources:
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Stanford University
Scope of Project
Subject Terms:
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Intra-household model;
Signaling;
Dynamic games;
Experiment;
Technology adoption
JEL Classification:
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D13 Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation
J16 Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
O12 Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
D13 Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation
J16 Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
O12 Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
Geographic Coverage:
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Malawi
Time Period(s):
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5/1/2019 – 7/31/2019
Universe:
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Signaling and Transfer experiments: Married monogamous couples sampled from 36 villages in Neno district, Southern Malawi
Market experiment: Married women in monogamous relationships, recruited while they were shopping at one of six local markets in Zomba district
Market experiment: Married women in monogamous relationships, recruited while they were shopping at one of six local markets in Zomba district
Data Type(s):
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experimental data;
survey data
Methodology
Unit(s) of Observation:
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Individual
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