Data and Code for: Polity size and local government performance: evidence from India
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Veda Narasimhan, NYU- Abu Dhabi; Jeffrey Weaver, University of Southern California
Version: View help for Version V1
| Name | File Type | Size | Last Modified |
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| Data | 05/09/2024 11:52:AM | ||
| appendix_exhibits | 05/09/2024 05:50:PM | ||
| code | 08/02/2024 04:52:PM | ||
| main_exhibits | 05/09/2024 05:50:PM | ||
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application/pdf | 291.9 KB | 10/10/2024 02:24:PM |
Project Citation:
Narasimhan, Veda, and Weaver, Jeffrey. Data and Code for: Polity size and local government performance: evidence from India. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2024. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2024-10-14. https://doi.org/10.3886/E202444V1
Project Description
Summary:
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Developing countries have increasingly decentralized power to local governments. This paper studies the implications of a central element of decentralization -- polity size -- using population-based discontinuities that determine local government boundaries for over 100,000 Indian villages. Over the short and long-run, individuals allocated into local governments with smaller populations have better access to public goods. We provide suggestive evidence that these results are related to heightened civic engagement and stronger political incentives, but not to other mechanisms such as elite capture.
Funding Sources:
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Swiss National Science Foundation (187942);
Forschungskredit of the University of Zurich (FK-19-017)
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H41 Public Goods
H75 State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions
O12 Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
P43 Other Economic Systems: Public Economics; Financial Economics
D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H41 Public Goods
H75 State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions
O12 Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
P43 Other Economic Systems: Public Economics; Financial Economics
Geographic Coverage:
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Uttar Pradesh, India
Time Period(s):
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1991 – 2022
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