ECIN Replication Package for "How policing incentives affect crime, measurement, and justice"
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Lucas Rentschler, Utah State University; Jordan Adamson, Leipzig University
Version: View help for Version V4
| Name | File Type | Size | Last Modified |
|---|---|---|---|
| Replication | 10/10/2024 04:35:PM |
Project Citation:
Rentschler, Lucas, and Adamson, Jordan . ECIN Replication Package for “How policing incentives affect crime, measurement, and justice.” Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2024-10-10. https://doi.org/10.3886/E201821V4
Project Description
Summary:
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In this paper we develop a model where the police choose between investigating and patrolling, while civilians choose between producing and stealing. We derive a truth table for the equilibrium numbers of criminals and producers, punished or not, that can holistically evaluate the effects of police performance incentives. To test the model, we conduct an experiment that varies how severely an officer is reprimanded for false punishments. We find that stronger reprimands do not change crime, increase civilian incomes, and decrease false positives. We also find that the clearance rate, a measure of performance used widely in econometric studies, suggests police performance is better when it is unambiguously worse.
Scope of Project
Subject Terms:
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police incentives;
clearance rate;
truth table of criminal justice
JEL Classification:
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C70 Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
J01 Labor Economics: General
K42 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
C70 Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
J01 Labor Economics: General
K42 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Manuscript Number:
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ECIN-May-2023-0231
Geographic Coverage:
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Utah State University
Time Period(s):
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3/1/2022 – 7/1/2022 (March to July of 2022)
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