Data and Code for: Complementary bidding and the collusive arrangement: Evidence from an antitrust investigation

Principal Investigator(s):  View help for Principal Investigator(s) Robert Clark, Queen's University; Decio Coviello, HEC Montreal; Adriano De Leverano, ANAC

Version:  View help for Version V1

Name File Type Size Last Modified
  3_replication_packageAEJMicro 02/20/2025 05:29:PM

Project Citation: 

Clark, Robert, Coviello, Decio, and De Leverano, Adriano . Data and Code for: Complementary bidding and the collusive arrangement: Evidence from an antitrust investigation. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2025. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2025-04-02. https://doi.org/10.3886/E201303V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary Clustered bids and a missing mass of nearly tied bids have both been proposed as markers of collusion. We present causal empirical evidence from an actual procurement cartel that bidding involves both clustering and a gap around the winning bid. We support these results with information from testimony of cartel participants that explain how both patterns arise naturally as part of an arrangement featuring complementary bidding. Based on these findings, we develop an easy-to-implement screen for collusive arrangements featuring complementary bidding.
Funding Sources:  View help for Funding Sources SSHRC Canada Research Chairs

Scope of Project

Subject Terms:  View help for Subject Terms Collusion; Auctions; complemenatary bidding
JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      D44 Auctions
      H57 National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement
      L22 Firm Organization and Market Structure
      L74 Construction
Geographic Coverage:  View help for Geographic Coverage Canada
Time Period(s):  View help for Time Period(s) 1/1/2010 – 1/1/2020
Universe:  View help for Universe Sample of auctions in the region of Quebec
Data Type(s):  View help for Data Type(s) other
Collection Notes:  View help for Collection Notes PDF of the data collected via FOIA to the cities of Montreal and Quebec in Canada

Methodology

Response Rate:  View help for Response Rate all procurement auctions for asphalt during the sampling period
Sampling:  View help for Sampling cities and time
Data Source:  View help for Data Source access of information to the city offices
Collection Mode(s):  View help for Collection Mode(s) other
Scales:  View help for Scales n.a.
Weights:  View help for Weights n.a.
Unit(s) of Observation:  View help for Unit(s) of Observation bids within auctions
Geographic Unit:  View help for Geographic Unit cities

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Published Versions

V1 [2025-04-02]

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