Data and Code for: Fiscal Rules and the selection of politicians: theory and evidence from Italy.
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Matteo Gamalerio, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona, University of Barcelona; Federico Trombetta, Catholic University of Milan
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Description
Summary:
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Fiscal rules, or constraints on the policymaking discretion of elected officials, are widely
used to regulate fiscal policies. Using data on Italian municipalities, we employ a
difference-in-discontinuity design to provide evidence of the negative effect of fiscal rules
on mayoral candidates’ education. Municipalities in which fiscal rules meaningfully
restrict the action space of politicians drive the effect. These results are consistent
with a formal model of fiscal rules and political selection. We highlight that reducing
discretion may affect the composition of the pool of players: it may alleviate pork-barrel
spending but also negatively affect the education of politicians.
used to regulate fiscal policies. Using data on Italian municipalities, we employ a
difference-in-discontinuity design to provide evidence of the negative effect of fiscal rules
on mayoral candidates’ education. Municipalities in which fiscal rules meaningfully
restrict the action space of politicians drive the effect. These results are consistent
with a formal model of fiscal rules and political selection. We highlight that reducing
discretion may affect the composition of the pool of players: it may alleviate pork-barrel
spending but also negatively affect the education of politicians.
Scope of Project
Subject Terms:
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fiscal rules;
selection of politicians;
deficit;
difference in discontinuity
JEL Classification:
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D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H62 National Deficit; Surplus
H70 State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: General
H72 State and Local Budget and Expenditures
D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H62 National Deficit; Surplus
H70 State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: General
H72 State and Local Budget and Expenditures
Geographic Coverage:
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Italy
Universe:
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All Italian municipalities
Data Type(s):
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administrative records data;
observational data
Methodology
Data Source:
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Bureau Van Dijk, (n.d.)
"Aida pa."
Fondazione Ing. Rodolfo Debenedetti, (2009). “Membri del Parlamento Italiano,” Milano, Fondazione Ing. Rodolfo Debenedetti.
Gamalerio, Matteo (2020). “Do national political parties matter? Evidence from Italian municipalities.” European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 63, June 2020.
Høyland, B., Sircar, I. and Hix, S. (2010)."An automated database of the european parliament."European Union Politics 10 (1) 143 - 152.
Ministero dell’Interno (n.d.). "Anagrafe degli amministratori locali e regionali."
Ministero dell’Interno, (1993-2016). “Eligendo,” Dipartimento per gli Affari Interni e Territoriali, Direzione Centrale per i Servizi Elettorali.
MEF, Dipartimento delle Finanze (n.d.). “Open Data Dichiarazioni."
Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (n.d.). "Codici delle unità amministrative."
Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (2006). “Ricostruzione della popolazione residente per età e sesso nei comuni italiani – Anni 1992-2001,” Informazioni n. 13. Istituto Nazionale di Statistica, Roma.
Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (2014). "Atlante Statistico dei Comuni."
Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (2019). “Ricostruzione statistica della popolazione residente per sesso, età e Comune."
La Repubblica, (n.d.) “Archivio de La Repubblica."
Nannicini, T., Stella, A., Tabellini, G., and Troiano U. (2013). "Social Capital and Political Accountability," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 5, 222-250.
OpenCivitas, (2015). “2010 Comuni – Fabbisogni, caratteristiche e prestazioni generali."
Fondazione Ing. Rodolfo Debenedetti, (2009). “Membri del Parlamento Italiano,” Milano, Fondazione Ing. Rodolfo Debenedetti.
Gamalerio, Matteo (2020). “Do national political parties matter? Evidence from Italian municipalities.” European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 63, June 2020.
Høyland, B., Sircar, I. and Hix, S. (2010)."An automated database of the european parliament."European Union Politics 10 (1) 143 - 152.
Ministero dell’Interno (n.d.). "Anagrafe degli amministratori locali e regionali."
Ministero dell’Interno, (1993-2016). “Eligendo,” Dipartimento per gli Affari Interni e Territoriali, Direzione Centrale per i Servizi Elettorali.
MEF, Dipartimento delle Finanze (n.d.). “Open Data Dichiarazioni."
Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (n.d.). "Codici delle unità amministrative."
Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (2006). “Ricostruzione della popolazione residente per età e sesso nei comuni italiani – Anni 1992-2001,” Informazioni n. 13. Istituto Nazionale di Statistica, Roma.
Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (2014). "Atlante Statistico dei Comuni."
Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (2019). “Ricostruzione statistica della popolazione residente per sesso, età e Comune."
La Repubblica, (n.d.) “Archivio de La Repubblica."
Nannicini, T., Stella, A., Tabellini, G., and Troiano U. (2013). "Social Capital and Political Accountability," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 5, 222-250.
OpenCivitas, (2015). “2010 Comuni – Fabbisogni, caratteristiche e prestazioni generali."
Unit(s) of Observation:
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Municipalities, years
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