Code for: Central Bank Credibility and Fiscal Responsibility
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Jesse Schreger, Columbia Business School; Pierre Yared, Columbia Business School; Emilio Zaratiegui, Columbia University
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Citation:
Schreger, Jesse , Yared, Pierre, and Zaratiegui, Emilio. Code for: Central Bank Credibility and Fiscal Responsibility. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2024. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2024-07-30. https://doi.org/10.3886/E196521V1
Project Description
Summary:
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We consider a New Keynesian model with strategic monetary and fiscal interactions. The fiscal authority maximizes social welfare. Monetary policy is delegated
to a central bank with an anti-inflation bias that suffers from a lack of commitment.
The impact of central bank hawkishness on debt issuance is non-monotonic because
increased hawkishness reduces the benefit from fiscal stimulus while simultaneously
increasing real debt capacity. Starting from high levels of hawkishness (dovishness),
a marginal increase in the central bank’s anti-inflation bias decreases (increases)
debt issuance
Scope of Project
Subject Terms:
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Policy Rules;
Public debt;
Optimal Taxation;
Fiscal Policy;
Monetary Policy
JEL Classification:
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D02 Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
E58 Central Banks and Their Policies
E62 Fiscal Policy
H21 Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
H63 National Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
D02 Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
E58 Central Banks and Their Policies
E62 Fiscal Policy
H21 Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
H63 National Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
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