Code for: "Disentangling Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection"
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Henrique Castro-Pires, University of Surrey; Hector Chade, Arizona State University; Jeroen Swinkels, Northwestern University
Version: View help for Version V1
| Name | File Type | Size | Last Modified |
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| Baseline | 08/16/2023 06:42:PM | ||
| Converging_MH_AS | 08/16/2023 06:38:PM | ||
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application/pdf | 250.7 KB | 09/26/2023 01:33:AM |
Project Citation:
Castro-Pires, Henrique, Chade, Hector, and Swinkels, Jeroen. Code for: “Disentangling Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection.” Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2023. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2023-12-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E193349V1
Project Description
Summary:
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While many real-world principal-agent problems have both moral hazard and adverse selection, existing tools largely analyze only one at a time. Do the insights from the separate
analyses survive when the frictions are combined? We develop a simple method–decoupling–to
study both problems at once. When decoupling works, everything we know from the separate analyses carries over, but interesting interactions also arise. We provide simple tests for
whether decoupling is valid. We develop and numerically implement an algorithm to calculate
the decoupled solution and check its validity. We also provide primitives for decoupling to
work, and analyze several extensions.
These files contain the programs for the journal article "Disentangling Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection", American Economic Review.
These files contain the programs for the journal article "Disentangling Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection", American Economic Review.
Scope of Project
Subject Terms:
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moral hazard;
adverse selection
JEL Classification:
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D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
D86 Economics of Contract: Theory
D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
D86 Economics of Contract: Theory
Data Type(s):
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program source code
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