Data and Code for: Contingent Reasoning and Dynamic Public Goods Provision
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Evan Calford, Australian National University; Timothy Cason, Purdue University
Version: View help for Version V1
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| Matlab | 06/08/2023 02:26:PM | ||
| Stata | 06/08/2023 02:24:PM | ||
| oTree | 06/08/2023 02:25:PM | ||
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application/pdf | 145.7 KB | 08/24/2023 06:51:AM |
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text/plain | 5.5 KB | 08/24/2023 04:14:AM |
Project Citation:
Calford, Evan, and Cason, Timothy. Data and Code for: Contingent Reasoning and Dynamic Public Goods Provision. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2024. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2024-04-05. https://doi.org/10.3886/E192103V1
Project Description
Summary:
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Data and Code for the article:
Contingent Reasoning and Dynamic Public Goods Provision
Abstract:
Contributions toward public goods often reveal information that is useful to others considering their own contributions. This experiment compares static and dynamic contribution decisions to determine how contingent reasoning differs in dynamic decisions where equilibrium requires understanding how future information can inform about prior events. This identifies partially cursed individuals who can only extract partial information from contingent events, others who are better at extracting information from past rather than future or concurrent events, and Nash players who effectively perform contingent thinking. Contrary to equilibrium, the dynamic provision mechanism does not lead to lower contributions than the static mechanism.
Contingent Reasoning and Dynamic Public Goods Provision
Abstract:
Contributions toward public goods often reveal information that is useful to others considering their own contributions. This experiment compares static and dynamic contribution decisions to determine how contingent reasoning differs in dynamic decisions where equilibrium requires understanding how future information can inform about prior events. This identifies partially cursed individuals who can only extract partial information from contingent events, others who are better at extracting information from past rather than future or concurrent events, and Nash players who effectively perform contingent thinking. Contrary to equilibrium, the dynamic provision mechanism does not lead to lower contributions than the static mechanism.
Funding Sources:
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Purdue University
Scope of Project
Subject Terms:
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cursed equilibrium;
voluntary contributions;
club goods;
laboratory experiment
JEL Classification:
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C91 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
D71 Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
D91 Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
H41 Public Goods
C91 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
D71 Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
D91 Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
H41 Public Goods
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