Data & Code for: Multigame Contact: A Double-Edged Sword for Cooperation

Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Vincent Laferrière, University of Lausanne; Joao Montez, University of Lausanne; Catherine Roux, University of Basel; Christian Thöni, University of Lausanne

Version: View help for Version V1

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0_data			05/31/2023 10:50:AM
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License.txt	text/plain	14.7 KB	06/05/2023 03:21:AM
README.txt	text/plain	5.4 KB	06/05/2023 03:22:AM
master.do	text/plain	1.5 KB	05/31/2023 06:49:AM

Project Citation:

Laferrière, Vincent, Montez, Joao, Roux, Catherine , and Thöni, Christian. Data & Code for: Multigame Contact: A Double-Edged Sword for Cooperation. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2024. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2024-04-03. https://doi.org/10.3886/E184141V1

Project Description

Summary: We study the effect of multigame contact on cooperation. In our experimental setup, each subject plays a pair of indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemmas. Multigame contact is present if a subject plays both games with a single partner, and it is absent if a subject plays each of the two games with a different partner. In contrast to the theoretical prediction, we find no evidence of multigame contact increasing overall cooperation rates. Nonetheless, multigame contact systematically affects behavior and outcomes, acting like a double-edged sword, in the sense that subjects link decisions across games and, consequently, periods of mutual cooperation and defection in both games become more likely, while periods of mutual cooperation in a single game become less likely.

Funding Sources: SNSF (100018_182185)

Scope of Project

Subject Terms: Cooperation; Repeated games; Prisoner’s dilemma; Multigame contact; Experiment

JEL Classification:
      C72 Noncooperative Games
      C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
      C91 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
      L41 Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

Geographic Coverage: , Switzerland

Time Period(s): 9/1/2020 – 5/31/2021

Collection Date(s): 9/1/2020 – 5/31/2021

Universe: Convenience sample, undergraduate students from the University of Lausanne and the EPFL recruited with ORSEE

Data Type(s): experimental data

Methodology

Sampling: Random invitation from the pool of subjects of the LABEX

Data Source: Laboratory Experiment

Collection Mode(s): other

Unit(s) of Observation: Independent unit of observation is the matching group

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Published Versions

V1 [2024-04-03]

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