Data and Code for: "Sovereign Debt Auctions In Turbulent Times"
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Harold Cole, University of Pennsylvania; Daniel Neuhann, University of Texas-Austin.; Guillermo Ordonez, University of Pennsylvania
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Citation:
Cole, Harold, Neuhann, Daniel, and Ordonez, Guillermo. Data and Code for: “Sovereign Debt Auctions In Turbulent Times.” Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2023. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2023-10-09. https://doi.org/10.3886/E167561V1
Project Description
Summary:
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We use a model of multi-unit discriminatory auctions with asymmetrically informed risk-averse bidders to analyze Mexican sovereign bond auctions during periods of macroeconomic stress. We argue that the discriminatory protocol provides insurance benefits to the government in bad times because it allows for uninformed bids above the marginal price to be executed at the bid price. Uninformed investors are willing to make such bids if the infra-marginal risk premium is large enough to offset the winner’s curse. In crisis periods, we infer 1 p.p. lower borrowing costs in the worst states of the world, but 2.2 p.p. higher average costs.
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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D44 Auctions
D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
F34 International Lending and Debt Problems
D44 Auctions
D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
F34 International Lending and Debt Problems
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