Data and Code for: Public Procurement in Law and Practice
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Erica Bosio, World Bank; Simeon Djankov, London School of Economics; Edward Glaeser, Harvard University; Andrei Shleifer, Harvard University
Version: View help for Version V1
| Name | File Type | Size | Last Modified |
|---|---|---|---|
|
|
text/plain | 24.2 KB | 02/01/2022 10:53:AM |
|
|
application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet | 117.9 KB | 02/01/2022 11:01:AM |
|
|
application/pdf | 170.8 KB | 01/17/2023 11:17:PM |
|
|
application/msword | 510.5 KB | 01/19/2022 07:07:PM |
Project Citation:
Bosio, Erica, Djankov, Simeon, Glaeser, Edward, and Shleifer, Andrei. Data and Code for: Public Procurement in Law and Practice. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2023. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2023-06-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E153181V1
Project Description
Summary:
View help for Summary
We examine a new dataset of public procurement laws, practice, and
outcomes in 187 countries. We measure
regulation as restrictions on the discretion of the procuring entities. We find that laws and practice are highly
correlated with each other across countries, and better practice are correlated
with better outcomes, but laws themselves are not correlated with outcomes. A closer look shows that stricter laws correlate
with improved outcomes, but only in countries with low public sector
capacity. We present a model of
procurement in which both regulatory rules and public sector capacity determine
procurement outcomes. In the model,
regulation is effective in countries with low public sector capacity, but not
in countries with high capacity because it inhibits the socially optimal
exercise of discretion to exclude low quality bidders.
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
View help for JEL Classification
D73 Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
H11 Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
H57 National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement
K42 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
D73 Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
H11 Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
H57 National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement
K42 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Related Publications
Published Versions
Report a Problem
Found a serious problem with the data, such as disclosure risk or copyrighted content? Let us know.
This material is distributed exactly as it arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the investigator(s) if further information is desired.