Code and Public Data for "Targeting In-Kind Transfers through Market Design: A Revealed Preference Analysis of Public Housing Allocation"
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Daniel Waldinger, New York University
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Citation:
Waldinger, Daniel. Code and Public Data for “Targeting In-Kind Transfers through Market Design: A Revealed Preference Analysis of Public Housing Allocation.” Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2021. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2021-07-15. https://doi.org/10.3886/E131162V1
Project Description
Summary:
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Code and instructions to reproduce analysis in the article "Targeting In-Kind Transfers through Market Design: A Revealed Preference Analysis of Public Housing Allocation."
Abstract: "Public housing benefits are rationed through waitlists. Theoretical work on public housing allocation has debated how much choice applicants should have over units, identifying a possible trade-off between efficiency and redistribution. This paper empirically establishes the existence and economic importance of this trade-off using waitlist data from Cambridge, MA. I estimate a model of public housing preferences in a setting where heterogeneous apartments are rationed through waiting time. Eliminating choice would improve targeting but reduce tenant welfare by more than 30 percent. Such a change is only justified on targeting grounds by a strong social preference for redistribution."
Abstract: "Public housing benefits are rationed through waitlists. Theoretical work on public housing allocation has debated how much choice applicants should have over units, identifying a possible trade-off between efficiency and redistribution. This paper empirically establishes the existence and economic importance of this trade-off using waitlist data from Cambridge, MA. I estimate a model of public housing preferences in a setting where heterogeneous apartments are rationed through waiting time. Eliminating choice would improve targeting but reduce tenant welfare by more than 30 percent. Such a change is only justified on targeting grounds by a strong social preference for redistribution."
Scope of Project
Subject Terms:
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public housing;
waitlist;
in-kind transfers;
targeting;
market design;
structural estimation;
revealed preference
JEL Classification:
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D40 Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: General
D47 Market Design
H40 Publicly Provided Goods: General
D40 Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: General
D47 Market Design
H40 Publicly Provided Goods: General
Geographic Coverage:
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Massachusetts, USA
Time Period(s):
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1/1/2010 – 12/31/2014 (January 2010 through December 2014)
Collection Date(s):
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1/1/2016 – 12/31/2017 (CHA data: winter/spring 2016. ACS data: winter 2017.)
Universe:
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The CHA data contain applicants for Cambridge Housing Authority programs who were on a waitlist between 2010 and 2015, and program participants during the same period.
The ACS data contain households living in Massachusetts between 2010 and 2014.
The ACS data contain households living in Massachusetts between 2010 and 2014.
Data Type(s):
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program source code;
survey data
Methodology
Data Source:
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U.S. Census Bureau. 2010–2014. “American Community Survey 1-year Public
Use Microdata Samples [DAT file].” Downloaded from https://usa.ipums.org/usa-action/variables/group (accessed on 2017-02-01).
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. 2016. "Income Limits Documentation System." https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/il.html Accessed on 2016-10-01.
CHA. 2016. "Waitlist and Tenant Microdata." https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/il.html. Accessed on 2016-10-01.
Public CHA Documents/Data Sources
CHA. 2007. "Cambridge Housing Authority Development Directory." https://cambridge-housing.org/download/47/public-housing-rad-fph-properties/4359/cha-development-directory.pdf. Accessed on 2016-09-01.
CHA. 2013. "Moving to Work Fiscal Year 2014 Annual Plan." https://cambridge-housing.org/download/42/annual-reports/4332/mtw-annual-report-fy14.pdf. Accessed on 2015-12-03.
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. 2016. "Income Limits Documentation System." https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/il.html Accessed on 2016-10-01.
CHA. 2016. "Waitlist and Tenant Microdata." https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/il.html. Accessed on 2016-10-01.
Public CHA Documents/Data Sources
CHA. 2007. "Cambridge Housing Authority Development Directory." https://cambridge-housing.org/download/47/public-housing-rad-fph-properties/4359/cha-development-directory.pdf. Accessed on 2016-09-01.
CHA. 2013. "Moving to Work Fiscal Year 2014 Annual Plan." https://cambridge-housing.org/download/42/annual-reports/4332/mtw-annual-report-fy14.pdf. Accessed on 2015-12-03.
Unit(s) of Observation:
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Household
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