Data and Code for: Stochastic Equilibria: Noise in Actions or Beliefs?
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Evan Friedman, University of Essex
Version: View help for Version V1
| Name | File Type | Size | Last Modified |
|---|---|---|---|
| Data-and-Code | 04/06/2021 05:53:PM |
Project Citation:
Friedman, Evan. Data and Code for: Stochastic Equilibria: Noise in Actions or Beliefs? Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2022. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2022-01-25. https://doi.org/10.3886/E130401V1
Project Description
Summary:
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We introduce noisy belief equilibrium (NBE) for normal form games in which players
best respond to noisy belief realizations. Axioms restrict belief-distributions to be
unbiased with respect to and responsive to changes in the opponents’ behavior. The
axioms impose testable restrictions both within and across games, and we compare
these restrictions to those of regular QRE in which axioms are
placed on the quantal response function as the primitive. NBE can generate similar
predictions as QRE in several classes of games. Unlike QRE, NBE is a refinement of
rationalizability and invariant to affine transformations of payoffs.
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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C72 Noncooperative Games
C92 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
D84 Expectations; Speculations
C72 Noncooperative Games
C92 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
D84 Expectations; Speculations
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