Data and Code for: Common Ownership in America 1980-2017

Principal Investigator(s):  View help for Principal Investigator(s) Christopher Conlon, NYU Stern School of Business; Matthew Backus, Columbia University; Michael Sinkinson, Yale University

Version:  View help for Version V1

Name File Type Size Last Modified
  code 09/09/2020 02:35:PM
  data 06/24/2020 09:50:PM
  figures 06/24/2020 09:51:PM
  tables 06/24/2020 09:51:PM
LICENSE text/plain 1 KB 06/24/2020 05:50:PM
README.md text/x-web-markdown 9.6 KB 08/17/2020 08:25:AM
README.pdf application/pdf 134.4 KB 08/17/2020 08:22:AM
requirements.txt text/plain 189 bytes 08/17/2020 06:40:AM
run_all.bat text/plain 843 bytes 06/24/2020 05:41:PM
run_all.sh application/x-sh 849 bytes 06/29/2020 08:42:AM

Project Citation: 

Conlon, Christopher, Backus, Matthew, and Sinkinson, Michael. Data and Code for: Common Ownership in America 1980-2017. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2021. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2021-07-15. https://doi.org/10.3886/E120083V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary
We empirically assess the implications of the common ownership hypothesis from a historical perspective using the set of S&P 500 firms from 1980–2017. We show that the dramatic rise in common ownership in the time series is driven primarily by the rise of indexing and diversification and, in the cross–section, by investor concentration, which the theory presumes to drive a wedge between cash flow rights and control. We also show that the theory predicts incentives for expropriation of undiversified shareholders via tunneling, even in the Berle and Means (1932) world of the widely held firm.

We include additional data on scraped SEC 13f forms for 2000-2017. The rest of the data is provided or downloaded from WRDS and requires a WRDS account.
Funding Sources:  View help for Funding Sources Brookings Institution

Scope of Project

Subject Terms:  View help for Subject Terms Common Ownership; financial institutions; investments
JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      G32 Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
      L00 Industrial Organization: General
      L13 Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
      L21 Business Objectives of the Firm
Geographic Coverage:  View help for Geographic Coverage United States
Time Period(s):  View help for Time Period(s) 1/1/2000 – 1/1/2018
Universe:  View help for Universe All Investors Filing SEC 13f forms.

We are limited to investments firms with large market capitalization to capture a superset of S&P500 components.
Data Type(s):  View help for Data Type(s) administrative records data; program source code
Collection Notes:  View help for Collection Notes See https://sites.google.com/view/msinkinson/research/common-ownership-data? for a full description of how data were collected.

Methodology

Data Source:  View help for Data Source SEC Form 13f filings. A full set of filings is available at:

https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcurrent

For a list of 13f securities please see: https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/13flists.htm


Collection Mode(s):  View help for Collection Mode(s) web scraping
Unit(s) of Observation:  View help for Unit(s) of Observation CUSIP/Firm, Number of Shares, Investor

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Published Versions

V1 [2021-07-15]

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