Replication data for: The Invisible Hand of the Government: Moral Suasion during the European Sovereign Debt Crisis

Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Steven Ongena; Alexander Popov; Neeltje Van Horen

Version: View help for Version V1

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Project Citation:

Ongena, Steven, Popov, Alexander, and Van Horen, Neeltje. Replication data for: The Invisible Hand of the Government: Moral Suasion during the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2019. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-12-07. https://doi.org/10.3886/E116414V1

Project Description

Summary: Using proprietary data on banks' monthly securities holdings, we show that during the European sovereign debt crisis, domestic banks in fiscally stressed countries were considerably more likely than foreign banks to increase their holdings of domestic sovereign bonds during months when the government needed to roll over a relatively large amount of maturing debt. This result cannot be explained by risk shifting, carry trading, or regulatory compliance. Domestic banks that received government support, are small, or with weaker balance sheets were particularly susceptible to "moral suasion," while governance of banks played less of a role.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
      D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
      E62 Fiscal Policy
      G21 Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
      G28 Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
      H11 Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
      H63 National Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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V1 [2019-12-07]

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