Replication data for: Unnatural Selection: Perverse Incentives and the Misallocation of Credit in Japan

Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Joe Peek; Eric S. Rosengren

Name	File Type	Size	Last Modified
AER-Final-Data-All-Lenders.TXT	text/plain	176 MB	12/06/2019 10:35:AM
AER-Final-Data-Step-All-Lenders.PRG	text/plain	6.1 KB	12/06/2019 10:35:AM
AER-Final-Data-Step.PRG	text/plain	6.2 KB	12/06/2019 10:35:AM
AER-Final-Data.TXT	text/plain	133.8 MB	12/06/2019 10:35:AM
AER-and-Venice-Master-Firm-File.XLS	application/octet-stream	50.7 KB	12/06/2019 10:35:AM
AER-and-Venice-Master-Firm-and-Year-File.XLS	application/vnd.ms-excel	919.5 KB	12/06/2019 10:35:AM
Calculate-Daily-Return-Indices.PRG	text/plain	3.5 KB	12/06/2019 10:35:AM
Calculate-Monthly-Return-Indices.PRG	text/plain	2.2 KB	12/06/2019 10:35:AM
Combine-Needs.PRG	text/plain	1.6 KB	12/06/2019 10:35:AM
Company-Names.xls	application/vnd.ms-excel	399 KB	12/06/2019 10:35:AM

Project Citation:

Peek, Joe, and Rosengren, Eric S. Replication data for: Unnatural Selection: Perverse Incentives and the Misallocation of Credit in Japan. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2005. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-12-06. https://doi.org/10.3886/E116062V1

Project Description

Summary: We examine the misallocation of credit in Japan associated with the perverse incentives faced by banks to provide additional credit to the weakest firms. Firms are more likely to receive additional bank credit if they are in poor financial condition, because troubled Japanese banks have an incentive to allocate credit to severely impaired borrowers in order to avoid the realization of losses on their own balance sheets. This "evergreening" behavior is more prevalent among banks that have reported capital ratios close to the required minimum, and is compounded by the incentives arising from extensive corporate affiliations.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
G21 Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
G28 Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation

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Published Versions

V1 [2019-12-06]

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