Data and Code for: Social Ties and the Selection of China's Political Elite
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Raymond Fisman, Boston University; Yonxiang Wang, University of Southern California; Jing Shi, Macquarie University; Weixing Wu, University of International Business and Economics
Version: View help for Version V2
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Project Citation:
Project Description
is equally strong for retiring Politburo members, arguing against quota-based explanations, and it is much stronger for junior Politburo members, consistent with a role for intra-factional competition. Our findings differ from earlier work because of our emphasis on within-group variation, and our focus on shared hometown and college -- rather than shared workplace -- connections.
Scope of Project
D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
P26 Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies: Political Economy; Property Rights
Methodology
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