Replication data for: Voluntary Contributions and Collective Redistribution
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Andrzej Baranski
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Citation:
Baranski, Andrzej. Replication data for: Voluntary Contributions and Collective Redistribution. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2016. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114338V1
Project Description
Summary:
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I study a multilateral bargaining game in which committee members invest in a common project prior to redistributing the total value of production. The game corresponds to a Baron and Ferejohn (1989) legislative bargaining model preceded by a production stage that is similar to a voluntary contribution mechanism. In this game, contributions reach almost full efficiency in a random rematching experimental design. Bargaining outcomes tend to follow an equity standard of proportionality: higher contributors obtain higher shares. Unlike other bargaining experiments with an exogenous fund, allocations involving payments to all members are modal instead of minimum winning coalitions, and proposer power is quite low.
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D63 Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D71 Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H41 Public Goods
C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D63 Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D71 Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H41 Public Goods
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