Replication data for: The Political Economy of the Greek Debt Crisis: A Tale of Two Bailouts

Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Silvia Ardagna; Francesco Caselli

Name	File Type	Size	Last Modified
Tables---Charts-January-2014.xlsx	application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet	500.1 KB	10/12/2019 06:07:PM

Project Description

Summary: We review the events that led to the May 2010 and July 2011 bailout agreements. We interpret the bailouts as outcomes of political-economy equilibria. We argue that these equilibria were likely not on the Pareto frontier, and sketch political-economy arguments for why collective policymaking in the Euro area may lead to suboptimal outcomes.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
      E58 Central Banks and Their Policies
      E62 Fiscal Policy
      F34 International Lending and Debt Problems
      G01 Financial Crises
      H61 National Budget; Budget Systems
      H63 National Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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Published Versions

V1 [2019-10-12]

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DDI 2.5

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