Replication data for: Hit or Miss? The Effect of Assassinations on Institutions and War
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Benjamin F. Jones; Benjamin A. Olken
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Citation:
Jones, Benjamin F., and Olken, Benjamin A. Replication data for: Hit or Miss? The Effect of Assassinations on Institutions and War. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2009. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114047V1
Project Description
Summary:
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Assassinations are a persistent feature of the political landscape.
Using a new dataset of assassination attempts on all world leaders
from 1875 to 2004, we exploit inherent randomness in the success
or failure of assassination attempts to identify the effects of assassination.
We find that, on average, successful assassinations of
autocrats produce sustained moves toward democracy. We also find
that assassinations affect the intensity of small-scale conflicts. The
results document a contemporary source of institutional change,
inform theories of conflict, and show that small sources of randomness
can have a pronounced effect on history. (JEL D72, N40, O17)
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
N40 Economic History: Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation: General, International, or Comparative
D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
N40 Economic History: Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation: General, International, or Comparative
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