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Project Citation: 

Panhans, Matthew. Replication data for: Adverse Selection in ACA Exchange Markets: Evidence from Colorado. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2019. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113720V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary This study tests for adverse selection in the Affordable Care Act (ACA) health insurance exchanges established in 2014 and quantifies the welfare consequences. Using a new statewide dataset of medical claims from Colorado, I use plausibly exogenous premium variation generated by geographic discontinuities to test for selection. Specifically, each $1 increase in monthly premiums causes a $0.85–0.95 increase in annual medical expenditures of the insured population in 2014, with attenuated effects in 2015. These estimates are consistent with the prevalence of chronic conditions and difference-in-differences estimates. The results offer the first quasi-experimental evidence of adverse selection in the ACA markets.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
      G22 Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
      H51 National Government Expenditures and Health
      H75 State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions
      I13 Health Insurance, Public and Private
      I18 Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health


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