Replication data for: Does Electoral Competition Curb Party Favoritism?

Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Marta Curto-Grau; Albert Solé-Ollé; Pilar Sorribas-Navarro

Version: View help for Version V1

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Project Citation:

Curto-Grau, Marta, Solé-Ollé, Albert, and Sorribas-Navarro, Pilar. Replication data for: Does Electoral Competition Curb Party Favoritism? Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2018. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113710V1

Project Description

Summary: We study whether incumbents facing uncontested elections channel public spending towards co-partisan officials more than is the case of incumbents that are worried about reelection. We draw on data on capital transfers allocated by Spanish regions to local governments during 1995–2007. Using a regression discontinuity design, we document strong and robust effects. We find that a mayor belonging to the party of the regional president obtains twice the amount in grants received by an opposition's mayor. This effect is much greater for regional incumbents that won the previous election by a large margin, but it disappears for highly competitive elections.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H76 State and Local Government: Other Expenditure Categories

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V1 [2019-10-12]

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