Replication data for: Unintended Effects of Anonymous Résumés

Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Luc Behaghel; Bruno Crépon; Thomas Le Barbanchon

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20140185_programs			10/12/2019 12:47:PM
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Project Citation:

Behaghel, Luc, Crépon, Bruno, and Le Barbanchon, Thomas. Replication data for: Unintended Effects of Anonymous Résumés. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2015. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113612V1

Project Description

Summary: We evaluate an experimental program in which the French public employment service anonymized résumés for firms that were hiring. Firms were free to participate or not; participating firms were then randomly assigned to receive either anonymous résumés or name-bearing ones. We find that participating firms become less likely to interview and hire minority candidates when receiving anonymous résumés. We show how these unexpected results can be explained by the self-selection of firms into the program and by the fact that anonymization prevents the attenuation of negative signals when the candidate belongs to a minority. (JEL J15, J68, J71)

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
      J15 Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination
      J68 Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies: Public Policy
      J71 Labor Discrimination

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V1 [2019-10-12]

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