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Project Citation: 

Rees-Jones, Alex. Replication data for: Mistaken Play in the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm: Implications for Positive Assortative Matching. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2017. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113503V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary Recent literature has documented failures of truthful preference reporting in the strategy-proof deferred acceptance algorithm. I consider the implications of these strategic mistakes for a common welfare consideration: the ability of the mechanism to sort the best students to the best schools. I find that these mistakes have the potential to significantly help or significantly hinder sorting. Through this channel, the presence of mistaken play may have widely varying welfare effects. I discuss related considerations in the welfare evaluation of mistaken play in the deferred acceptance algorithm and the implications for "nudges" that correct these mistakes.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
      D12 Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
      D47 Market Design
      D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
      I21 Analysis of Education


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