Replication data for: Market Regulations, Prices, and Productivity

Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Gilbert Cette; Jimmy Lopez; Jacques Mairesse

Name	File Type	Size	Last Modified
P2016_1025_data			10/12/2019 11:02:AM
LICENSE.txt	text/plain	14.6 KB	10/12/2019 07:02:AM

Project Citation:

Cette, Gilbert, Lopez, Jimmy, and Mairesse, Jacques. Replication data for: Market Regulations, Prices, and Productivity. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2016. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113446V1

Project Description

Summary: This study is, to our knowledge, the first attempt to infer the consequences on productivity entailed by anticompetitive regulations in product and labor markets through their impacts on production prices and wages. Results show that changes in production prices and wages at country*industry levels are informative about the creation of rents impeding productivity in different ways and to different extents. A simulation based on OECD regulation indicators suggests that nearly all countries could expect sizeable gains in multifactor productivity from the implementation of large structural reform programs changing anticompetitive regulation practices on product and labor markets.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
      D24 Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity
      J08 Labor Economics Policies
      L51 Economics of Regulation
      O47 Empirical Studies of Economic Growth; Aggregate Productivity; Cross-Country Output Convergence

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Published Versions

V1 [2019-10-12]

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DDI 2.5

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