Name File Type Size Last Modified
LICENSE.txt text/plain 14.6 KB 10/12/2019 05:44:AM
README_data_pginst_AER.txt text/x-diff 2.5 KB 10/12/2019 05:44:AM
data_pginst_AER.dta application/octet-stream 240.6 KB 10/12/2019 05:44:AM
data_pginst_AER.raw text/plain 302 KB 10/12/2019 05:44:AM

Project Citation: 

Kosfeld, Michael, Okada, Akira, and Riedl, Arno. Replication data for: Institution Formation in Public Goods Games. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2009. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113317V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary Sanctioning institutions are of utmost importance for overcoming free-riding tendencies and enforcing outcomes that maximize group welfare in social dilemma situations. We investigate, theoretically and experimentally, the endogenous formation of institutions in public goods provision. Our theoretical analysis shows that players may form sanctioning institutions in equilibrium, including those governing only a subset of players. The experiment confirms that institutions are formed and that it positively affects cooperation and group welfare. However, the data also shows that success is not guaranteed. Players are unwilling to implement equilibrium institutions in which some players have the opportunity to free ride. Our results emphasize the role of fairness in the institution formation process. (JEL C72, D02, H41)

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      C72 Noncooperative Games
      D02 Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
      H41 Public Goods


Related Publications

Published Versions

Export Metadata

Report a Problem

Found a serious problem with the data, such as disclosure risk or copyrighted content? Let us know.

This material is distributed exactly as it arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the investigator(s) if further information is desired.