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Project Citation: 

Friebel, Guido, Heinz, Matthias, Krueger, Miriam, and Zubanov, Nikolay. Replication data for: Team Incentives and Performance: Evidence from a Retail Chain. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2017. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113141V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary In a field experiment with a retail chain (1,300 employees, 193 shops), randomly selected sales teams received a bonus. The bonus increases both sales and number of customers dealt with by 3 percent. Each dollar spent on the bonus generates $3.80 in sales, and $2.10 in profit. Wages increase by 2.2 percent while inequality rises only moderately. The analysis suggests effort complementarities to be important, and the effectiveness of peer pressure in overcoming free-riding to be limited. After rolling out the bonus treatment, and control shops' performance converge, suggesting long-term stability of the treatment effect.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      D22 Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
      J31 Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
      J33 Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
      L25 Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope
      L81 Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce
      M53 Personnel Economics: Training
      M54 Personnel Economics: Labor Management


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