Name File Type Size Last Modified
  AER-2014-1409-Replication-Files 10/12/2019 02:52:AM
LICENSE.txt text/plain 14.6 KB 10/11/2019 10:52:PM

Project Citation: 

Di Tella, Rafael, Perez-Truglia, Ricardo, Babino, Andres, and Sigman, Mariano. Replication data for: Conveniently Upset: Avoiding Altruism by Distorting Beliefs about Others’ Altruism. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2015. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113016V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary We present results from a "corruption game" (a dictator game modified so that recipients can take a side payment in exchange for accepting a reduction in the overall size of the pie). Dictators (silently) treated to be able to take more of the recipient's tokens, took more of them. They were also more likely to believe that recipients had accepted side payments, even if there was a prize for accuracy. The results favor the hypothesis that people avoid altruistic actions by distorting beliefs about others' altruism. (JEL C72, D63, D64, D83)

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      C72 Noncooperative Games
      D63 Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
      D64 Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
      D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness


Related Publications

Published Versions

Export Metadata

Report a Problem

Found a serious problem with the data, such as disclosure risk or copyrighted content? Let us know.

This material is distributed exactly as it arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the investigator(s) if further information is desired.